Thou Shalt Make No Law Respecting an Establishment of Religion: ACLU v. McCreary County, Van Orden v. Perry, and the Establishment Clause by Flecker, Anthony
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 21 
Issue 1 Volume 21, Fall 2006, Issue 1 Article 6 
October 2006 
Thou Shalt Make No Law Respecting an Establishment of 
Religion: ACLU v. McCreary County, Van Orden v. Perry, and the 
Establishment Clause 
Anthony Flecker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Flecker, Anthony (2006) "Thou Shalt Make No Law Respecting an Establishment of Religion: ACLU v. 
McCreary County, Van Orden v. Perry, and the Establishment Clause," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic 
Development: Vol. 21 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol21/iss1/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
COMMENTS
THOU SHALT MAKE NO LAW RESPECTING
AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION: ACLU
V. MCCREAR Y COUNTY, VAN ORDEN V.
PERRY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
ANTHONY FLECKER*
INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court decided two cases
involving the display of the Ten Commandments on public
property, McCreary County v. ACLU, and Van Orden v. Perry.2
The Court had last heard a case related to this issue in 1980,
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2006. The author wishes to
thank Professor Philip Weinberg for his guidance regarding this Note, and Edward H.
Flecker, Gabriella Flecker, and Charissa A. Squicciarini for their unwavering support.
1 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
2 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
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where a 5-4 majority struck down in, Stone v. Graham,3 a
Kentucky law requiring that a copy of the Ten Commandments
be posted on the wall of every public classroom in the state. The
Court's holding in Stone had been the subject of divergent
interpretation by lower federal courts and the decision to hear
two additional cases was likely an attempt by the Court to more
clearly define the scope of its ruling of unconstitutionality in
Stone. The purpose of this piece is to review the principles
behind the Court's holding in Stone, analyze its approach to
related cases in the subsequent 25 years, review its most recent
decisions, and determine whether those decisions will resolve
certain difficult issues that have been the subject of debate in
this area of the law.
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Leading Up to Stone: The
Lemon Test
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 4 applies to
the various states through the Fourteenth Amendment 5 and
provides that the government "shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."6 The Supreme Court's interpretation
as to the scope of this clause had undergone a great deal of
modification in the years before the Court first addressed the Ten
Commandments issue in Stone.7 In the 1947 case Everson v.
Board of Education,8 the Court declared that the Establishment
3 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding Kentucky statute requiring posting of Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms to be without a secular legislative purpose
and, therefore, unconstitutional).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (elucidating the foremost
application of Establishment Clause to the states); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
580 (1992) (confirming incorporation of First Amendment's Religion Clauses through
Fourteenth Amendment).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)
(interpreting the framers' intentions via the language chosen in the Establishment
Clause).
7 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding recitation of Regent's prayer
in public schools violates Establishment Clause); see also Kristin J. Graham, Comment,
The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle: Coercion as the Touchstone of an Establishment
Clause Violation, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 158 (1994) (acknowledging a "major shift in the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which consisted of an outright rejection of
the coercion analysis and a movement toward the creation of a new analytical framework,
began in 1962").
8 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding resolution which provided state-funded bus service to
students of public and parochial schools).
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Clause created a "wall of separation" between church and state
that "must be kept high and impregnable."9 However, this
standard was subsequently relaxed only five years later in
Zorach v. Clauson,O which stated that separation of church and
state is not required, or even possible, in "every and all
respects."11 The Court sought to establish uniformity in the 1971
decision Lemon v. Kurtzman,12 developing a three-part analysis
that became known as the "Lemon Test."13 This test dictated that
government action, in order to avoid violating the Establishment
Clause, must have a secular legislative purpose, have a principal
or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and,
finally, not foster an excessive government entanglement with
9 Id. at 16-17 (establishing the "wall of separation" test, but, nevertheless, deciding
that the Board of Education's practice of funding transportation for parochial school
students did not penetrate the "wall"); see Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)
(quoting Thomas Jefferson's interpretation of the Establishment Clause when initially
proposed).
10 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (finding that a state law permitting absence from public school
for religious education and observance was constitutional and declaring that the
Establishment Clause did not require governmental hostility towards religion or
prevention of religious influence).
11 Id. at 312-13. A "common sense" interpretation of the Establishment Clause
recognizes the "specific ways" in which "there shall be no concern or union or dependency"
between church and state. Id. Under a more strict interpretation, the Court stated:
the state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile, suspicious, and even
unfriendly. Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities
would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups.
Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the
Constitution.
Id. Furthermore, the Court recognized religion-based traditions that have taken on
secular meaning and added that, under an overly strict reading, "[p]rayers in our
legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the
proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; 'so help me God' in our courtroom
oaths - these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our
public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment." Id. For a
suggestion that "the Court undermined its own foundational pronouncements for
Establishment Clause analysis" with its position in Zorach, see Theologos Verginis, Note,
ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board: Is There Salvation for the
Establishment Clause? 'With God All Things Are Possible," 34 AKRON L. REV. 741, 743
(2001).
12 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing the "Lemon test" for Establishment Clause
review).
13 See Am. Family Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2001) (recognizing that "[i]n Lemon v. Kurtzman .. , the Supreme Court
established the now widely known Lemon test for analyzing government conduct under
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment"); see also Graham, supra note 7, at
162-63 (discussing the three-prongs of the Lemon test).
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religion.14 It was under this relatively (and temporarily) stable
framework that the Court decided Stone v. Graham in 1980.15
B. The Stone Decision
In Stone, a Kentucky law required that a permanent copy of
the Ten Commandments be posted on the wall of every public
classroom in the state, along with a notation recognizing that the
commandments were instrumental as a fundamental legal code
in the development of American common law.16 The Court found
this statute to violate the first prong of the Lemon Test.17
Despite the Kentucky legislature's assertions as to the
commandments' historical significance in the development of
American legal principle18  and the statute's written-in
requirement that such significance be explained on each
14 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (1971) (stating these three tests "may be gleaned" from
"the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years"); see also Graham,
supra note 7, at 162 (discussing the implications of the Court's analysis in Lemon).
15 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (applying the Lemon Test and
recognizing it as used for "determining whether a challenged state statute is permissible
under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution"); see also Bradley M.
Cowan, Note, The Decalogue in the Public Forum: Do Public Displays of the Ten
Commandments Violate the Establishment Clause?, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 183, 187 (2004)
(stating "[a]ny discussion of the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments display must
begin with Stone v. Graham, the only United States Supreme Court opinion to address
the issue").
16 See Stone, 449 U.S. at 40 n.1 (describing a state statute that required the
superintendent of public instruction to display "a durable, permanent copy of the Ten
Commandments... on a wall in each public elementary and secondary school classroom
in the Commonwealth"); see also Cowan, supra note 15, at 186 (emphasizing the Court's
decision in Stone not to mention factual findings and quoting Judge N. Williams as
stating at trial that "[t]he Legislature has declared the Ten Commandments to be the
fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the common law of the United States"
and "[t]he common law grew under the influence of men who were free to know and study
the Ten Commandments and to adopt the principles of the canon law as it related to
various subjects under consideration").
17 See Cowan, supra note 15, at 185 (recounting the Stone Court's description of the
Kentucky legislatures' secular application of the Ten Commandments as a "sham"); see
also David C. Pollack, Note, Writing on the Wall of Separation: Understanding the Public
Posting of Religious Duties and Sectarian Versions of Sacred Texts as an Establishment
Clause Violation in Ten Commandments Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363, 1380 (2004)
(noting that Stone relied on the Lemon test's first prong).
18 See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 (reviewing state's argument that secular purpose was
established through the legally required notation which read 'The secular application of
the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States" in small print at the
bottom of all displays); Pollack, supra note 17, at 1380 (opining that Stone Court refused
"to be 'blinded' by the legislature's 'avowed' secular purpose" allegedly evident in the
notation required on each display).
[Vol. 21:1
THOU SHALTAIKE NO LA W
display, 19 the Court found the law to be lacking in secular
purpose,20 stating that:
The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten
Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in
nature. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that
fact. The Commandments do not confine themselves to
arguably secular matters, such as honoring one's parents,
killing or murder, adultery, stealing, false witness, and
covetousness... Rather, the first part of the
Commandments concerns the religious duties of believers:
worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using
the Lord's name in vain, and observing the Sabbath Day.21
Though such language would seem to indicate that the Ten
Commandments cannot be separated from their primarily
religious significance, the Court refused to extend the holding of
Stone beyond the specific facts of that case.22 Rather, in the time
leading up to the Van Orden and McCreary decisions, many of
the Court's declarations indicated a trend towards less restriction
in such areas. 23
19 See Stone, 449 U.S. at 40 n.1 (alluding to the notation required by statute); Cowan,
supra note 15, at 187 (noting Kentucky legislature's requirement that notation avowing
secular purpose be attached to the bottom of each Ten Commandments display).
20 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (declaring the "avowed" secular
purpose specified in Kentucky's statute insufficient to avoid violation of the First
Amendment); Pollack, supra note 17, at 1380 (recognizing that the disclaimer declaring
the "secular application of the Ten Commandments" as "foundational legal text" was
ineffective in helping the displays meet requisite constitutional secular purpose).
21 Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42. The Court further added that:
Posting of religious texts on the wall serves no educational function. If the posted
copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the
schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the
Commandments. However desirable this might be as a matter of private devotion, it
is not a permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause.
Id.
22 See Lauren Cates, Comment, Issues in the Third Circuit: Freethought Society v.
Chester County and the Ten Commandments Debate: The Buck Stops Here for
Establishment Clause Challenges to Religious Public Displays in the Third Circuit, 49
VILL. L. REV. 907, 907 (2004) (focusing on the Supreme Court's "case-by-case approach to
deciding Establishment Clause challenges to religious public displays" and observing that
"such fact-specific ... analysis inevitably leads to inconsistent holdings..."); see also
Cowan, supra note 15, at 187 (stating that "the Court itself has rejected the per se
approach to analyzing Ten Commandments displays").
23 Cowan, supra note 15, at 199 (noting the "noticeable trend in the Court that is
increasingly protective of private religious speech on public property"); see also Cates,
supra note 22, at 908 (commenting that because the Court had not recently decided any
Ten Commandments cases, its prior decision upholding the display of a bronze Ten
2006]
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C. The Supreme Court's Approach to Similar Issues Following
Stone
The Court limited the language of Stone in Edwards v.
Aguillard,24 where it noted that the holding in Stone "did not
mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten Commandments,
or that the Ten Commandments played an exclusively religious
role in the history of Western Civilization."25 Furthermore,
though the Court relied on a Lemon analysis in Stone, it later
acknowledged in Lynch v. Donnelly26 that "we have repeatedly
emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or
criterion in this sensitive area,"27 and that "no fixed, per se rule
can be framed" to govern all Establishment Clause cases.28 Thus,
the Court, seemingly in the name of flexibility, developed
alternative Establishment Clause tests. 29
i. The Endorsement Test
It was in Lynch that Justice O'Connor, in her concurring
opinion, 30 first introduced the "Endorsement Test,"31 which has
become increasingly prevalent in Supreme Court Establishment
Commandments plaque outside a courtroom constituted an important indication of
acceptable public displays religious in nature).
24 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
25 Id. at 593-94 (referencing Stone holding as it related to issue of the
constitutionality of a state statute requiring either the banishment of the theory of
evolution from state schools or the presentation of a religious viewpoint that altogether
rejected evolutionary principles).
26 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (plurality opinion).
27 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (1984) (plurality opinion). The Lynch Court further noted
that the Court had not always relied on the Lemon test in the past; it specifically stated
that "[i]n two cases, the Court did not even apply the Lemon 'test.' We did not, for
example, consider that analysis relevant in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Nor
did we find Lemon useful in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) where there was
substantial evidence of overt discrimination against a particular church." Id.
28 Id. at 678 (stating "Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clauses is not a
precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application").
29 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (stating an unwillingness to use any single test for
Establishment Clause cases); see also H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can
There be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 203,
275 (1999) (noting that "[i]n recent years the Court has used two major alternative tests
to that of Lemon, the Endorsement Test and the coercion test," despite the fact that
"neither test ha[d] yet received much support from the entire Court...").
30 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (introducing the
Endorsement Test for constitutionality under the Establishment clause).
31 See id. at 688-89 (recognizing need to clarify current Establishment Clause
standards); see also Emilie Kraft Bindon, Entangled Choices: Selecting Chaplains for the
United States Armed Forces, 56 ALA. L. REV. 247, 265 (2004) (noting Justice O'Connor's
attempt in Lynch to clarify constitutional analysis of the Establishment Clause).
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Clause analyses. 32 The Endorsement Test was developed as a
method of clarifying the Lemon Test to increase its usefulness as
a device for Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 33 Specifically,
the Endorsement Test incorporates the principle of
"entanglement" from the third prong of the Lemon Test,34 while
additionally requiring that government action not endorse or
disapprove of religion. 35  A state action can violate the
Establishment Clause under either of these two standards. 36 In
Lynch, Justice O'Connor defined endorsement of religion as
sending "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, as well as an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community." 37
32 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594-95 (1989) (applying Endorsement Test);
see also James E. McBride, Note, Alcoholics Anonymous: Anonymous Theists? Griffin v.
Coughlin and the 'Wall of Separation between Church and State" in the New York State
Prison System, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1478 (1998) (asserting that "although the
Lemon test has not been openly repudiated, the birth and evolution of the Endorsement
Test, which has garnered increasing support on the Court, shows that the former's
influence is on the wane").
33 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(indicating "[flocusing on institutional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval
of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device"); see also Bindon, supra note
31, at 265 (describing Endorsement Test as tool to clarify the Lemon test).
34 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that one principal
way government can "run afoul" of the Establishment Clause is through "excessive
entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere with the independence of
the institutions, give the institutions access to government or governmental powers not
fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of political
constituencies defined along religious lines"); see also George Linge, Comment, Ensuring
the Full Freedom of Religion on Public Lands: Devils Tower and the Protection of Indian
Sacred Sites, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 336 (2000) (explaining Lemon and
Endorsement tests' multiple prongs).
35 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (identifying that "[e]ndorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community" while "[d]isapproval sends the opposite message"); see also Linge,
supra note 34, at 336 (noting governmen-t has impermissibly endorsed religion if it deems
one favored or preferred).
36 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (stating that "[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community"); see also Elizabeth A. Harvey, Casenote, Freiler v.
Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education: Squeeze the Lemon Test Out of the Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 299, 311-12 (2001) (discussing the
Endorsement and Lemon tests).
37 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (defining
"endorsement" as it relates to Establishment Clause jurisprudence); see also Harvey,
supra note 36, at 311 (stating "government cannot endorse religious practices and beliefs
of some citizens without sending a message to those who disagree that they are not full
members of the political community").
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The majority of the Court assented to Justice O'Connor's
Endorsement Test in Allegheny v. ACLU,38 acknowledging that
"[i]n recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to
whether the challenged governmental practice either has the
purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion, a concern that has long
had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence."39
ii. The Coercion Test
While the Endorsement Test has been a common standard of
Establishment Clause review,4 0 the Court, nevertheless, adopted
a different approach in Lee v. Weisman,41 formulating what has
become known as the "Coercion Test."42 The Court stated that "at
a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' 43 Therefore, under
this test, government expression will violate the Establishment
Clause where the government compels individuals to participate
in religious activities or where the government's actions are so
38 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (finding an isolated creche display in a public place
unconstitutional, while deciding that a reasonable observer would not view a menorah,
when displayed together with a Christmas tree, as an endorsement of the Jewish faith
because such a display sends "a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the
holiday season").
39 Id. at 592 (adopting a version of Endorsement Test standards in Establishment
Clause analysis); see Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 698 (2002) (discussing Endorsement Test).
40 See Feldman, supra note 39, at 698 (noting that every member of the Court has
accepted the Endorsement Test ); see also Timothy R. Fox, Comment and Note, Alabama
v. ACLU: A Missed Opportunity to Correct Flawed Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
11 REGENT U.L. REV. 193, 209 (1999) (positing that "the Supreme Court has typically
applied either the Lemon test or the Endorsement Test to decide the constitutionality of
religious displays on government property.., although the Endorsement Test has been
used more often in recent years").
41 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
42 See Stephen M. Durden, In the Wake of Lee v. Weisman: The Future of School
Graduation Prayer is Uncertain at Best, 2001 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 111, 149 (2001)
(discussing Court's application in Lee of the Coercion Test); see also Philip Oliss,
Casenote, Praise the Lord and Pass the Diplomas: Harris v. Joint School District No. 241,
41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 705, 740 (1996) (recognizing that "[]udges
and scholars have suggested that Lee, which found that the school's inclusion of the
graduation prayer unconstitutionally coerced attending students, established a coercion
test for Establishment Clause cases pertaining to prayer and students").
43 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (stating further that "[t]he principle that government may
accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations
imposed by the Establishment Clause" (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984))).
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beneficial to one religious sect as to create a state or federal
religion.44
D. Important Legal Distinctions
Further complicating the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence are several distinctions that have been made
involving the factual circumstances surrounding government
religious action in the public sphere. 45 Regardless of which test
the Court may use in a given case, certain key factors may have a
substantial influence over the Court's decision.46
i. Private Speech vs. Government Speech
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens47 noted that "[t]here is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which
the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect."48 This distinction has been upheld by the Court in
44 See Verginis, supra note 11, at 746-47 (noting that Coercion Test "would invalidate
governmental action only where the government compels individuals to participate
religiously or where the government's actions directly benefit a particular sect to such a
dangerous extent so as to establish a state or federal religion"); see also Alberto B. Lopez,
Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette's Imbalance of Free Speech and
Establishment, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 193 (2003) (citing two prongs of coercion test).
45 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2323 (2004)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (espousing concept of "ceremonial deism" where certain
government expression, which has lost its religious character from repetition or
assimilation, can acknowledge or refer to religious ideas without violating the
Constitution); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(plurality opinion) (differentiating between private speech occurring in a designated
public forum and such expression taking place on property reserved for official
government purposes); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990) (plurality opinion) (explaining distinction between private speech and government
speech); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (noting that the Court has
been "particularly vigilant" in protecting against religious expression in public schools, as
opposed to other public fora).
46 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (positing
"the complementary constitutional provisions" of the Religion Clauses "and the
inexhaustibly various circumstances of their applicability have defied any simple test and
have instead produced a combination of general rules often in tension at their edges"); see
also Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Supreme Court and the Establishment
Clause at the Dawn of the New Millennium: "Bristling with Hostility to All Things
Religious" or Necessary Separation of Church and State?, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 231, 260
(2001) (discussing use of three Establishment Clause tests).
47 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion).
48 Id. at 250.
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several subsequent opinions.49 In Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette,50 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
declared that "[b]y its terms the Establishment Clause, U.S.
Const. amend. I, applies only to the words and acts of
government." Justice Scalia went on to state that the First
Amendment "is not meant to serve as an impediment to purely
private religious speech connected to the state only through its
occurrence in a public forum."51 Therefore, an individual's private
contribution to a government-created forum is not government
speech 52 and is thus protected under the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses.53
ii. Public Fora vs. Property Reserved for Official Use
However, not all private religious speech will be treated in the
same manner. 54 Private speech is given greater deference if it
occurs in a designated public forum rather than on property
reserved for specific and official government use.55 In Pinette, the
plurality emphasized this distinction in finding constitutionality
under the Establishment Clause with regard to the private
display of Ku Klux Klan crosses in a public square. 56 Justice
Scalia stated that:
49 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (confirming that
Court "certainly agree[s] with that distinction"); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 765 (recognizing the
distinction between government speech and private speech for Establishment Clause
purposes); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995)
(quoting Justice O'Connor's assertions in Mergens).
50 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (plurality opinion).
51 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 767 (1995)
52 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 302 (noting that not all statements
taking place on government property are messages that belong to the government (citing
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819)); see also Kelly J. Coghlan, Those Dangerous Student Prayers,
32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 809, 833 (2001) (discussing Court's recognition that an individual's
speech in government-created forum may remain the individual's own private speech).
53 See Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
250 (1990) (plurality opinion) (asserting that private speech endorsing religion is
protected under Religion Clauses); see also Coghlan, supra note 52, at 832-33 (noting
Constitutional protection of private religious speech).
54 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761 (stating "speech which is constitutionally protected
against state suppression is not thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all property
owned by the State"); see also Lopez, supra note 44, at 202 (recognizing the Court's view
that First Amendment does not always protect speech on government-owned property).
55 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761 (explaining strict standard whereby state can only
limit expressive content in public forum if necessary to serve a compelling state interest);
see also Lopez, supra note 44, at 202 (discussing application of the strict compelling state
interest standard to facts of Pinette).
56 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (concluding that conditions of allowable religious
expression were satisfied such that the State could not bar respondent's cross from the
0 THOU SHALT MAKE NO LA W
The right to use government property for one's private
expression depends upon whether the property has by law or
tradition been given the status of a public forum, or rather
has been reserved for specific official uses. If the former, a
state's right to limit protected expressive activity is sharply
circumscribed. It may impose reasonable, content-neutral
time, place, and manner, but it may regulate expressive
content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest.57
Under the test established in Pinette, religious expression is
valid under the Establishment Clause where it "(1) is purely
private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum,
publicly announced and open to all on equal terms."58 This
remains true regardless of whether the public may erroneously
misconstrue the content as government speech. 59 The plurality in
Pinette held the crosses to be constitutional because the display
took place on government property that was open to the public
for speech, permission was requested on the same terms required
of other private groups, and the state did not sponsor the
expression. 60
iii. Religious Expression in Schools vs. Other Public Fora
It is clear from Stone that the Court will be highly protective
against religious displays in the classroom setting.61 The Court
acknowledged this principle in Edwards,62 recognizing that:
capital square); see also Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV.
489, 528-29 (2004) (discussing Court's holding in Pinette).
57 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(plurality opinion).
58 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (1995) (plurality opinion) (holding that "the State may not,
on the claim of misperception of official endorsement, ban all private religious speech
from the public square, or discriminate against it by requiring religious speech alone to
disclaim public sponsorship").
59 See id. at 765 (stating further that "[g]iven an open forum and private sponsorship,
erroneous conclusions by the public do not count").
60 See id. at 761-62 (drawing comparisons between the specific facts of Pinette and
those of previous Supreme Court cases).
61 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980). The Court in Stone further stated:
If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be
to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey,
the Commandments. However, desirable this might be as a matter of private
devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause.
Id.
62 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (describing Court's more protective attitude towards
religious expression in schools).
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It has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance
with the
Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.
Families
entrust public schools with the education of their children,
but condi-
tion their trust on the understanding that the classroom
will not
purposely be used to advance religious views that may
conflict with
the private beliefs of the student and his or her family.
Students in such
institutions are impressionable and their attendance is
involuntary...
The State exerts great authority and coercive power through
mandatory
attendance requirements, and because of the students'
emulation of
teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility
to peer
pressure. 63
In establishing the Coercion Test in Lee, the Court made a
similar pronouncement, stating:
There are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of
conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary
and secondary public schools ... Prayer exercises in public
schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion. The
concern may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is
most pronounced there. What to most believers may seem
nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever
respect their religious practices, in a school context may
appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy.64
63 Id.
64 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
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The possibility of coercion expressed in Edwards and Lee
seemingly does not exist to the same extent in other public fora.65
Therefore, the Court will give the least amount of deference to
any religious expression taking place within a classroom or
schoolyard setting.66
iv. Religious Expression vs. Ceremonial Deism
In addition, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to create
an Establishment Clause exception for forms of expression that
are deemed "ceremonial deism."67 This concept was introduced in
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Lynch, where he stated:
Such practices as the designation of "In God We Trust" as
our national motto, or the references to God contained in the
Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be understood... as
a form a 'ceremonial deism' protected from Establishment
Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote
repetition any significant religious content.68
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 69 the Court
agreed to hear a case involving the use of the words "under God"
in the Pledge of Allegiance. 70  Although the case was
65 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583-84 (explaining high possibility of coercion in public
school setting can be traced to mandatory attendance requirements, students' emulation
of teachers as role models, and children's susceptibility to peer pressure); see also Lee, 505
U.S. at 592 (maintaining there is particular risk of coercion in school arena).
66 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583-84 (citing susceptibility to coercion within school
setting as impetus to vigilantly monitor compliance with the Establishment Clause); see
also Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (noting there are heightened concerns invoked when court
addresses Establishment Clause violations within schools).
67 See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2091-97 (1996) (noting that the phrase 'ceremonial deism' "was
coined by former Yale Law School Dean Walter Rostow in a 1962 lecture he delivered at
Brown University" and that "Rostow reconciled the Establishment Clause with a 'class of
public activity, which ... could be accepted as so conventional and uncontroversial as to
be constitutional"' (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86
(1964))); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (dissenting opinion)
(describing exception to Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is invoked when
something that could be construed as religious has lost its significance through rote
repetition).
68 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
69 542 U.S. 1 (2004)
70 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 4 (2004) (summarizing that respondent viewed the Pledge
as religious indoctrination of his son and that certiorari was granted to review both the
overriding constitutional issue as well as respondent's standing); Martin Guggenheim,
Stealth Indoctrination: Forced Speech in the Classroom, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 62
(2004) (outlining two questions granted certiorari in Newdow).
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anticlimactically decided on standing grounds, 71 Justice
O'Connor addressed the idea of a ceremonial deism exception in
her concurring opinion 72 by suggesting that:
Government can, in a discrete category of cases,
acknowledge or refer to the divine without offending the
Constitution. This category of "ceremonial deism" most
clearly encompasses such things as the national motto ("In
God We Trust"), religious references in traditional patriotic
songs such as the Star-Spangled Banner, and the words with
which the Marshal of this Court opens each of its sessions
("God save the United States and this honorable Court") ...
Any coercion that persuades an onlooker to participate in an
act of ceremonial deism is inconsequential, as an
Establishment Clause matter, because such acts are simply
not religious in character. As a result, symbolic references to
religion that qualify as instances of ceremonial deism will
pass the coercion test as well as the endorsement test.73
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor emphasized four factors to help
determine the existence ceremonial deism: (1) the history and
ubiquity of the practice; (2) the absence of worship or prayer; (3)
the absence of reference to a particular religion; and (4) minimal
religious content. 74 Though the Court has yet to expressly create
a ceremonial deism exception, 75 the concept has been discussed
71 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 4 (concluding that respondent lacked standing); Stephen
K. Green, Reconciling the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses: Federalism and the
Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 762 (2005) (noting
that Newdow was decided on standing grounds).
72 See Newdow 542 U.S. at 33-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing cases of
"ceremonial deism" as constitutional); Rachel Prouser, Current Event: Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 235, 248 (2005) (stating
"[t]he concurring opinions of Justice Rehnquist, and particularly that of Justice O'Connor,
demonstrate their continued adherence to the doctrine of ceremonial deism . . ").
73 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 37-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing ceremonial
deism and what prevents such instances from violating the Constitution).
74 See Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37-43 (2004)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (evaluating, in light of the four factor test, whether "under God"
constitutes ceremonial deism); Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept
of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. REV. 1, 23 (2004) (analyzing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Newdow).
75 See Todd Collins, Lost in the Forest of the Establishment Clause: Elk Grove v.
Newdow, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2004) (asserting Justice O'Connor's views, "if
accepted by a majority of the Court, would uphold the Pledge based on the Endorsement
Test and establish a constitutional exception for references that can be defined as
ceremonial deism"); see also Z. Ryan Pahnke, Note, Originalism, Ceremonial Deism and
the Pledge of Allegiance, 5 NEV. L.J. 742, 764 (2005) (noting that Supreme Court Justices
have implicitly relied on "ceremonial deism" throughout Establishment Clausejurisprudence and discussing O'Connor's standard as necessary to any future explicit
adoption of such an exception).
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on several occasions and seems to be gaining popularity.76 In
sum, the possibility of such an exception warrants attention as
the Court's approach to the Establishment Clause continues to
develop.
E. Split in the Lower Courts
Due to the uncertain scope of the Court's holding in Stone77
and the metamorphoses in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
that took place in the subsequent twenty-five years, 78 the circuit
courts took differing stances on issues involving the posting of
Ten Commandments displays on government property. 79
Although the specific facts of each case were not identical,80 the
76 See Collins, supra note 75, at 4 (emphasizing "at least five Justices appear to
accept the constitutionality of 'ceremonial deism,' or those public activities, such as
references to God, that indeed recognize religion but may not violate the Establishment
Clause"); see also Pahnke, supra note 75, at 764-65 (highlighting Justices who have
mentioned ceremonial deism both implicitly and explicitly in their opinions).
77 See Stephen K. Green, The Fount of Everything Just and Right? The Ten
Commandments as a Source of American Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 525, 529 (1999)
(describing uncertainty caused by Stone); see also Joel L. Thollander, Thou Shalt Not
Challenge the Court? The Ten Commandments Defense Act as a Legislative Invitation for
Judicial Reconsideration, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 234 (2001) (positing that
Stone needs to be clarified).
78 See Thollander, supra note 77, at 234 (suggesting "the changes in the makeup of
the Court and in Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the twenty years since Stone
make a reconsideration of that decision appropriate"); Joan Biskupic, Court Enters Debate
Over Display of Commandments, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 2, 2005, at 1A (highlighting Court
decisions since Stone which have allowed displays of some religious symbols on public
property).
79 See Cowan, supra note 15, at 189 (explaining "[t]he controversy surrounding the
Stone decision is reflected in lower federal and state courts, which are sharply divided
over the constitutionality of displaying the Ten Commandments on government
property"); see also Green, supra note 77, at 529-30 (stating "[b]ased on this uncertainty
of whether the Ten Commandments can be officially acknowledged as a source of law,
lower courts have split on the propriety of its public display").
80 See ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2004),
vacated by No. 02-2444, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Neb. Apr. 6, 2004); ACLU v.
McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005);
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235
F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 2000). In Plattsmouth, a Ten Commandments monument owned by
the City of Plattsmouth was displayed in a park owned by the city. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d
at 1025. In McCreary County, three different public displays of the Ten Commandments
were challenged, all of which initially consisted of at least one framed copy of the Ten
Commandments that was not part of a larger display. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 441-42.
In Glassroth, a monument of the Ten Commandments was displayed in the rotunda of the
Alabama State Judicial Building and had been placed their by the Chief Justice of the
Alabama Supreme Court. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284. In Books, a monument inscribed
with the Ten Commandments was located on the lawn in front of the Municipal Building
of the City of Elkhart. Books, 235 F.3d at 294.
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Sixth,81 Seventh,8 2 Eighth83 and Eleventh 84 Circuits held such
practice to violate the Establishment Clause.8 5 Conversely, the
Third,86 Fifth87 and Tenth8 8 Circuits held the practice to be
81 See McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 460 (applying Lemon Test in finding three
separate displays, purporting to honor the "Foundations of American Law and
Government," unconstitutional); see also Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding a Ten Commandments monument, consisting of an amalgamation of Jewish,
Protestant, and Catholic versions of the commandments, tablets containing ancient
Hebrew script, an "all-seeing eye, similar to the one depicted on the dollar bill," an
American eagle holding the American flag, Stars of David, and a symbol representing
Christ and two Greek letters, Chi and Rho, donated to Kentucky's state capitol grounds
by the Fraternal Order of Eagles to be without a secular purpose).
82 See Elkhart, 235 F.3d at 294-95 (declaring unconstitutional a Ten Commandments
monument, similar to that in Adland, located on the lot of a city municipal building); see
also Cowan, supra note 15, at 191 (noting "[t]he Seventh Circuit concluded that the Ten
Commandments monument violated the Establishment Clause because it failed the first
and second prongs of the Lemon test").
83 The Eighth Circuit ruled that a Ten Commandments monument, in a memorial
park located ten blocks from city hall, was solely religious in purpose with its primary
effect being the promotion of Judeo-Christian theology. See ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of
Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1042 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated by 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004). The monument was basically the same as those in Adland
and Books despite being donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles. See id. Recent court
cases regarding placement and settings of religious monuments, including Plattsmouth,
were comparatively analyzed for their content. See Greg Abbot, Acknowledgement Without
Endorsement: Defending the Ten Commandments, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 229, 232 n.16
(2005).
84 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a finding that a Ten Commandments monument,
erected by the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court on the State Judicial
Building, was a violation of the Establishment Clause where the monument was installed
"in order to remind all Alabama citizens of, among other things, [the Chief Justice's] belief
in the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church." See
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1284. The Chief Justice had refused to allow a monument
displaying a historically significant speech along with the commandments "on the
grounds that 'the placement of a speech of any man alongside the revealed law of God
would tend in consequence to diminish the very purpose of the Ten Commandments
monument."' See Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F.Supp. 2d. 1290, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2002). The
decision in Glassroth was controversial and accordingly scrutinized by legal and religious
scholars. See Brett G. Scharffs, Proceedings of the 2004 AALS Meeting: Section on Law
and Religion: One Nation Under God?: Unity, Diversity, and Neutrality Under the
Religion Clauses: Introduction, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 983, 987 (2004).
85 See Cowan, supra note 15, at 189-90 (identifying aggregation of Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Eleventh circuits splitting with Third, Fifth, and Tenth circuits regarding
constitutionality of Ten Commandments displays); David Pollack, supra note 17, at 1386
(noting circuit split regarding whether Ten Commandments displays constitutionality can
be mitigated by their setting).
86 Using a modified Lemon test, the Court found an 80-year-old plaque on courthouse
grounds depicting the protestant version of the Ten Commandments permissible, due to
the secular purpose of demonstrating a key source of American law. See Freethought Soc'y
v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 256-60 (3d Cir. 2003). The court was satisfied that a
reasonable observer would view the plaque for its historical significance, rather than as
an endorsement of protestant beliefs. See id. This version of the Lemon Test, modified
after Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, was applied in the Modrovich case, and
ultimately followed in the Third Circuit. See Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d
397, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2004).
87 A Ten Commandments monument, displayed on capitol grounds along with many
other items of secular historical significance was held constitutional because a reasonable
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allowable. 89 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Sixth Circuit's holding in ACLU v. McCreary County9O and the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Van Orden v. Perry.91
ANALYSIS: HOW THE COURT DECIDED THE CASES IT AGREED TO
HEAR
A. ACLU v. McCreary County
i. Facts
This case involved the posting of copies of the Ten
Commandments in two county courthouses and local district
public schools. 92 The copies were not originally part of any larger
educational, historical, or retrospective exhibit,93 but were twice
altered by the county, purportedly in an effort to comply with the
First Amendment and prevent further litigation.94 As amended,
observer would not perceive the monument as an endorsement of religion. See Van Orden
v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003). The monument in Van Orden was similar to
those in Adland, Books, and City of Plattsmouth, and was, likewise, donated by the
Fraternal Order of Eagles. See id. The Van Orden monument, moreover, was distinct in
its placement, as it was surrounded by a wide array of monuments, plaques and seals
honoring Texas' secular and religious history. See id. The Modrovich court followed the
guise of Van Orden and commented on the Fifth Circuit's holding of constitutionality
regarding public display of the Ten Commandments. See Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 413.
88 See Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 33-34 (10th Cir. 1973)
(concluding that display of Ten Commandments monument was permissible under the
Establishment Clause because it was passive, primarily secular, and erected by a non-
religious, fraternal organization); Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 176 (noting a monument
similarly donated by the sectarian fraternal order).
89 See Cowan, supra note 15, at 189-90 (contrasting the approach followed by the
Third, Fifth, and Tenth circuits with that followed by the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh circuits regarding the constitutionality of Ten Commandments displays);
Pollack, supra note 17, at 1386 (discussing difference of views from circuits regarding
constitutionality of Ten Commandments on public grounds).
90 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003).
91 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Will Hear 2
Church-State Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at 23 (reporting Supreme Court's decision
to hear two cases involving the constitutionality of posting of the Ten Commandments on
public property).
92 See McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 441-43 (reviewing facts at issue with regard to
display of Ten Commandments).
93 See McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 441-42 (noting the courthouse display was
erected pursuant to an order by the McCreary County Judge Executive).
94 See McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 442 (stating that, after plaintiffs filed suit,
defendants altered the displays "in an attempt to bring the displays within the
parameters of the First Amendment and to insulate themselves from suit" (quoting ACLU
v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 684 (E.D. Ky. 2000))).
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the courthouse displays professed to honor the "Foundations of
American Law and Government" 95 and consisted of "the entire
Star Spangled Banner, the Declaration of Independence, the
Mayflower Compact, the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, the
National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, the
Ten Commandments, Lady Justice and a one-page prefatory
document." 96 The prefatory included a general description of the
display, stating that it contained "documents that played a
significant role in the foundation of our system of law and
government."97 The display also contained another introductory
description referring specifically to the Ten Commandments:
The Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the
formation of Western legal thought and the formation of our
country. That influence is clearly seen in the Declaration of
Independence, which declared that, "We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
95 See ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing
particular displays of the Ten Commandments as well as their respective surroundings).
96 Id. at 443. The version of the commandments displayed at the courthouses read as
follows:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is
in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water underneath
the earth: Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD
thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto
the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.
Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain: for the LORD will not
hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honour thy father and mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the
LORD thy God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife,
nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is
thy neighbour's.
Id. at 443 n. 2.
97 Id. at 443 (specifying documents on display in courthouses).
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endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness." The Ten Commandments provide the moral
background of the Declaration of Independence and the
foundation of our legal tradition. 98
The School Board displays depicted the same documents as the
courthouse displays, with the exception that the Ten
Commandments were shown as excerpted from the
Congressional Record. 99 In addition, the School Board displays
contained a Kentucky Statute permitting the posting of historical
displayslOO and a School Board Resolution101 which stated:
We believe these ... documents positively contribute to the
educational foundations and moral character of students in
our schools ... It is our opinion that these ... documents,
taken as a whole, are valuable examples of documents that
may instill qualities desirable of the students in our schools,
98 Id.
99 Id. at 443-44 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court noted specifically:
The Ten Commandments were included in a statement of Representative Philip M. Crane
of Illinois in which he discussed a Joint Resolution authorizing then-President Reagan to
declare 1983 to be the "Year of the Bible" ... Representative Crane's version of the Ten
Commandments reads:
1. I am the Lord thy God, thou shalt have no other gods before me.
2. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image.
3. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.
4. Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy.
5. Honor thy father and mother.
6. Thou shalt not kill.
7. Thou shalt not commit adultery.
8. Thou shalt not steal.
9. Thou shalt not bear false witness.
10. Thou shalt not covet.
Id. at 443 n. 3.
100 See id. (mentioning Kentucky state statute depicted on the Ten Commandments
display regarding the posting of historical items).
101 See ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 443-44 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
"[t]he Resolution also contained a procedure that would permit any person to request the
posting of other historical documents with the permission of the Harlan County Board of
Education").
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and have had particular historical significance in the
development of this country. 102
The Sixth Circuit, strongly influenced by Stone,103 held that
the counties' "avowed" secular purpose of recognizing historical
significance104 was insufficient to avoid a First Amendment
conflict. 105 The schoolhouse displays were struck down because
"the very text in which the Ten Commandments are
contained... manifests a patently religious purpose."106 The
courthouse displays were likewise held invalid,107 as they were
viewed to "manifest a religious purpose because they utterly
fail[ed] to integrate the Ten Commandments with a secular
subject matter."108 Furthermore, the circuit court described the
Ten Commandments as "inherently religious,"109 and lacking "a
102 Id.
103 See id. at 448. The court stated:
To comply with Stone, however, a purported historical display must present the Ten
Commandments objectively and integrate them with a secular message. When such a
display consists almost entirely of reading material posted in a public school, the
most logical way of achieving this goal is by integrating the Ten Commandments with
a secular curriculum, such as through the objective study of history, ethics or
comparative religion.
Id.
104 Id. at 454. The court further stated:
When distilled to their essence, the courthouse displays demonstrate that
Defendants intend to convey the bald assertion that the Ten Commandments formed
the foundation of American legal tradition. The Supreme Court has held... that
"such an 'avowed' secular purpose is not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First
Amendment when no effort has been made to integrate the Ten Commandments with
a discussion or display of a secular subject matter."
Id. (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)).
105 See id. (finding the fact that the courthouse displays "emphasize[d] a single
religious influence, with no mention of any other religious or secular influences" was
significant in finding the display unconstitutional).
106 Id. at 453.
107 ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 460 (6th Cir. 2003). In finding the
displays unconstitutional the court stated that "[a] reasonable observer of the displays
cannot connect the Ten Commandments with a unifying historical or cultural theme that
is also secular." See id. The circuit court noted that all of the documents other than the
Ten Commandments relate in some fashion to post-1215 A.D. Western European or
American culture and that several of the others related to an American symbol, an
American slogan and an American song. See id. Additionally, the court noted that many
people find the Ten Commandments to be wholly religious in nature. See id.
108 Id. at 454-55 (asserting that "sandwiching the Ten Commandments between
secular texts does not necessitate a finding that the primary purpose of the displays is
secular.., where the content of the displays otherwise indicates a predominate religious
purpose").
109 Id. at 455 (6th Cir. 2003) (recognizing religious nature of the Ten Commandments
as evidenced by their use as sacred texts in the Christian and Jewish faiths).
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demonstrated analytical or historical connection with the other
documents."110
ii. The Supreme Court Decision
In its opinion, delivered by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court
considered only the constitutionality of the displays posted in the
county courthouses, as the schoolhouse displays were the subject
of a separate petition to the Court."'l Justice Souter's opinion,
joined by four other justices, held that the development of the
displays evinced a clear religious objective by the counties, and
that such a manifest objective was, by itself, sufficient to violate
the "secular legislative purpose" prong of the Lemon Test.112 The
Court noted that "the eyes that look to purpose belong to an
'objective observer,' one who takes account of the traditional
external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute."' 113 The Court rejected the idea of
an "absentminded objective observer""l 4 and focused on the
history of the displays, placing a great deal of importance on the
fact that the Commandments were originally posted by
themselves, rather than as part of any larger secular historical
display."l 5 The counties' inclusion of other historical documents
in the displays, following earlier litigation, was viewed mostly as
an excuse for the counties to continue their sectarian practice of
posting the Commandments. 116
110 Id. at 451.
111 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2728 n.1 (2005) (noting
that issue of Ten Commandments in schoolrooms of Harlan County was subject of a
separate petition).
112 See id. at 2745 (affirming lower court's finding of "predominantly religious
purpose" behind the Counties' three Ten Commandments displays).
113 Id. at 2735 (quoting Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
308 (2000)).
114 See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2736-37.
115 Id. at 2738 (concluding that display of Ten Commandments was not part of
"arguably secular display").
116 The Court took exception to the Counties' juxtaposition of the Ten
Commandments and the Declaration of Independence by stating that the Ten
Commandments "are sanctioned as divine imperatives, while the Declaration of
Independence holds that the authority of government to enforce the law derives 'from the
consent of the governed[.]" See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2741
(2005). The Court further stated that, upon seeing the displays, "if [an] observer had not
thrown up his hands, he would probably suspect that the Counties were simply reaching
for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses constitutionally
required to embody religious neutrality." See id.
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iii. Analysis
Given the Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
it seems that the decision in McCreary was unduly harsh.
Clearly, the displays should be classified as "government speech,"
as they were erected in response to county legislation, rather
than pursuant to private organization funding, and thus require
an increased level of scrutiny.ll 7 However, had the Court relied
on its more modern Endorsement Test (rather than continuing
its unpredictable practice of occasionally reviving the Lemon
Test), it is unlikely that it would have determined that the
counties were endorsing, through their amended displays, the
Judeo-Christian beliefs normally associated with the Ten
Commandments. 118
Under the Endorsement Test,119 government must avoid both
an excessive entanglement with religion and an endorsement of
religion by sending a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders and a message to adherents that they are favored
members of the political community.120 In McCreary, the Ten
Commandments represented the only item of religious
117 See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (declaring that Establishment Clause forbids "government speech
endorsing religion"); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 766 (1995) (plurality opinion) (noting "government speech" is subject to limits of
Establishment Clause).
118 See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 635 (1989) (applying Endorsement Test and
noting display in secular context may negate the inherent religious nature of religious
symbols); see also Verginis, supra note 11, at 745 (deeming Endorsement Test as more
flexible than the Lemon Test).
119 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(espousing a two-part standard for Establishment Clause review that has become known
as the "Endorsement Test '); see also Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 575 (1989)
(employing the Endorsement Test for the first time in holding that displaying an isolated
creche in a public place was unconstitutional, while deciding that a reasonable observer
would not view a menorah, when displayed together with a Christmas tree, as an
endorsement of the Jewish faith, as such a display sends "a message of pluralism and
freedom of belief during the holiday season"); Bindon, supra note 31, at 267 (suggesting
because "the coercion test has only been applied by the majority in cases involving school
prayer," Endorsement is more likely to be used in McCreary but admitting the coercion
test "could be relevant in other situations as well").
120 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., Concurring) (defining "endorsement" of
religion as sending "a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community"); see also Shahin Rezai, Note,
County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40
Am. U. L. Rev. 503, 520-21 (1990) (explaining "endorsement" as previously espoused by
Justice O'Connor in Lynch).
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significance in any of the displays. 21  While this could
conceivably be viewed as favoritism towards those religions to
which the Commandments are sacred, it must be remembered
that founders of the United States government held primarily
Judeo-Christian beliefs,122  meaning that the Ten
Commandments and other such documents evincing Judeo-
Christian morality were likely far more influential in the
development of American law than other religious texts. 123
Regardless of the initial legislative purpose behind the decision
to post earlier versions of the displays, the current secular
purpose of recognizing influential documents in the development
of American law is seemingly sufficient to avoid excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. Furthermore, the
current design appears sufficient to constitute a legitimate
secular purpose rather than one merely "avowed" by the local
government.124 While the Court described the selection of
historical documents chosen for display by the counties to be
"odd" and "baffling,"125 the Court's responsibility should be to
decide whether the Commandments are integrated with items of
121 See ACLU v. McCreary, 354 F.3d 438, 460 (6th Cir. 2003). The circuit court noted
that "all of the other documents relate in some fashion to Western European or American
culture since 1215; several of the documents are legal in nature, one is an American
symbol, one is an American slogan and one is an American song," in contrast to the Ten
Commandments, which "are several thousands of years old, were not a product of
European or American culture and, many believe, are the word of God." See id.
122 See Ellis Washington, Reply to Judge Richard A. Posner on the Inseparability of
Law and Morality, 3 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1, n.9 (2001) (stating "[t]o the Framers,
the law of the Constitution was firmly rooted in irrevocable, Judeo/Christian precepts of
liberty, through obedience to God's laws"); see also Karen T. White, The Court-Created
Conflict of the First Amendment: Marginalizing Religion and Undermining the Law, 6 J.
LAW. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 208 (1994) (stating "[b]iblical principles guided the drafters of the
various state constitutions, and their experience in turn guided the drafters of the federal
constitution").
123 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the Ten Commandments "have had a significant impact on the development
of secular legal codes of the Western World"); see also Amy Greeley, Note, Glassroth v.
Moore: Why Courts Should Consider Aesthetic Context in Determining Whether Certain
Religious Displays Survive the Establishment Clause Test, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511,
511 (2004) (describing how a Ten Commandments frieze delivers the message that
commandments are "being offered as a primary source of American law").
124 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 635 (stating that religious symbols displayed in secular
context may "negat[e] any message of endorsement"); see also Stone, 449 U.S. at 41
(holding that the "avowed" secular purpose of displaying the Ten Commandments, for
their development as the fundamental legal code of Western civilization, was insufficient
to avoid conflict with the First Amendment).
125 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2740 (2005) (noting the
bizarre choice to display patriotic anthem and Magna Carta, while excluding original
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment where theme was documents with
"foundational" nature).
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historical secular significance,126 rather than to act as an arbiter
in determining the wisdom of a local government's decision to
include certain historical documents while excluding others. A
reasonably informed viewer would seem to be able to recognize
the importance of Ten Commandments in the development of
fundamental American legal principles, especially where the
Commandments are displayed with other influential historical
documents in a display entitled "The Foundations of American
Law and Government."127 An objective observer visiting a
Kentucky courthouse would most likely not be familiar with the
"intimate details" of the legislative history of these displays128
and would, therefore, be likely to view the Ten Commandments
within their secular and historical context that is clearly set forth
by the displays, without considering the purpose of earlier
displays that are no longer publicly posted. Therefore, the
courthouse displays in McCreary should have been held to be
constitutional.
The schoolhouse displays, however, are most likely
unconstitutional. As recognized by the Court in Edwards, school
children are highly impressionable and, therefore, more likely to
believe that the government is endorsing Judeo-Christian beliefs
through the displays. 129 It would seem that a child viewing the
Ten Commandments in the vicinity of documents illustrative of
actual American law, could reasonably view the Commandments
126 See id. at 2738 (noting "Stone stressed the significance of integrating the
Commandments into a secular scheme to forestall the broadcast of an otherwise clearly
religious message..."); see also Stephen B. Presser, The Ten Commandments Mish-Mosh,
THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Oct. 1, 2005 (explaining how the exhibition of the Ten
Commandments in McCreary County failed under each of the Lemon test's three prongs).
127 McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2739 (noting courthouse displays "placed the
Commandments in the company of other documents the Counties thought especially
significant in the historical foundation of American government."); see Presser, supra note
126 (reiterating Justice Scalia's viewpoint that the display was facially secular, and
documents therein played a significant role in creating our legal system and government).
128 McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2740 (stating "[c]ounties' claims did not, however,
persuade the [lower] court, intimately familiar with the details of this litigation, or the
Court of Appeals, neither of which found a legitimizing secular purpose in this third
version of the display").
129 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-84 (1987) (explaining that Court's
more protective attitude towards religious expression in public schools in light of factors
such as parents' expectation that schools will not influence their children's religious
beliefs, mandatory attendance requirements, children's impressionability, desire to
emulate teachers, and susceptibility to peer pressure); see also School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 252-53 (1963) (stating that choice or compulsion to
attend specified institution is crucial when determining whether implementing religious
practices and teaching is permissible).
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as a pronouncement of law to be respected and adhered to in the
same manner as is the Bill of Rights.130 Such an effect is not
problematic where a child adopts the belief that she should not
kill or steal, but it seems to become impermissibly coercive when
she believes that she is being instructed to "[r]emember the
Sabbath day to keep it holy."131 Children are significantly more
likely to view the display of the Ten Commandments, depicted
along with official American government instruments, as an
adoption of a state or federal religion.132 Therefore, under the
Coercion Test,133 the schoolhouse displays in McCreary should be
held to violate the Establishment Clause.
B. Van Orden v. Perry
i. Facts
At issue in Van Orden was a Ten Commandments monument
previously donated in 1961 by the Fraternal Order of Eagles
organization for display on Texas state capitol grounds.1 34 The
monument was similar to other displays which had been donated
to various states by the organization, often leading to similar
litigation.135 Many such displays were the brainchild of motion
130 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 623 (noting since students are impressionable, they
should be presented with creation science without religious content); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1210 (1992)
(recognizing basic, fundamental principle that declarations of rights contained in Bill of
Rights should be taught diligently to children because they are of paramount importance).
131 ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing Fourth
Amendment appearing in classroom displays at issue), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2988, 2989
(2005) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
132 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584 (commenting on students' impressionable nature,
compounded by desire to emulate educators, and likelihood of caving to peer pressure); see
also Verginis, supra note 11, at 746-47 (noting coercion test "would invalidate
governmental action only where the government compels individuals to participate
religiously or where the government's actions directly benefit a particular sect to such a
dangerous extent so as to establish a state or federal religion").
133 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (introducing coercion test as
analysis for Establishment Clause cases); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 701-
02 (1984) (explaining where government financing, power, and prestige envelop religious
beliefs, religious minorities are indirectly coerced to conform).
134 See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting the twenty-two
acre Texas state capitol grounds were dedicated on May 16, 1888 and were a protected
National Historic Landmark maintained by the State Preservation Board).
135 See Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2002) (describing a Ten
Commandments monument, nearly identical to the monument described in Van Orden,
donated to Kentucky's state capitol grounds by the Fraternal Order of Eagles); ACLU
Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding
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picture producer Cecil B. DeMille and were funded to promote
DeMille's film "The Ten Commandments" which was released in
the 1950s.136 The Texas monument displayed a nonsectarian
version of the Commandments,137 and depicted two small tablets
with ancient Hebrew script, as well as an American eagle
grasping the American flag, an eye inside a pyramid (similar to
the symbol displayed on the one-dollar bill), two small Stars of
David, and two Greek letters, Chi and Rho, intended to represent
constitutional a monument similar to that at issue in Van Orden); Books v. City of
Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 2000) (declaring unconstitutional a Ten
Commandments monument located on a municipal building's lot).
136 The court recounted DeMille's collaboration with juvenile court judge, E.J.
Ruegemer, which lead to erection of Books monument and countless similar displays:
Disheartened by the growing number of youths in trouble, . . . [Ruegemer] sought to
provide them with a common code of conduct. He believed that the Ten
Commandments might provide the necessary guidance. Judge Ruegemer originally
planned to post paper copies of the Ten Commandments in juvenile courts, first in
Minnesota and then across the country. To help fund his idea, he contacted the
Fraternal Order of Eagles ("FOE"), a service organization dedicated to promoting
liberty, truth, and justice. At first, FOE rejected Judge Ruegemer's idea because it
feared that the program might seem coercive or sectarian. In response to these
concerns, representatives of Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism developed
what the individuals involved believed to be a nonsectarian version of the Ten
Commandments because it could not be identified with any one religious group. After
reviewing this version, FOE agreed to support Judge Ruegemer's program.
Around this same time, motion picture producer Cecil B. DeMille contacted Judge
Ruegemer about the program. DeMille, who was working to produce the movie "The
Ten Commandments," suggested that, rather than posting mere paper copies of the
Ten Commandments, the program distribute bronze plaques. Judge Ruegemer
replied that granite might be a more suitable material because the original Ten
Commandments were written on granite. DeMille agreed with Judge Ruegemer's
suggestion, and the judge thereafter worked with two Minnesota granite companies
to produce granite monuments inscribed with the Ten Commandments. Local
chapters of FOE financed these granite monuments and then, throughout the 1950s,
donated them to their local communities. The Elkhart chapter of FOE donated its
version of the Ten Commandments monument to the City of Elkhart in 1958.
Books, 235 F.3d at 294-95; see also Peter Lewis, Religious Monument May Stay, Judge
Rules; Ten Commandments - For 46 Years, It Has Stood on Public Land in Everett,
SEArTLE TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005 at B1 (noting that DeMille helped distribute Ten
Commandment monuments).
137 The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas described the
Ten Commandments display as an amalgamation of Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic
versions:
It is a granite monolith, more than six feet high and more than three feet wide. One
side of the monument contains no engraving and is smooth. Engraved on the other
side is a version of the Ten Commandments without any "chapter and verse" citation
to the Old Testament and with no identification of the specific English translation of
the Old Testament from which the wording is taken.
Van Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26709, at *5 (W.D. Tex.,
Oct. 2, 2002), aff'd, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. Tex. 2003).
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Christ. 138 All expenses in connection with the monument "were
borne exclusively by the Eagles"139 and the state selected the site
of its display "on the recommendation of the Building
Engineering and Management Division of the State Board of
Control."140
The capitol building was surrounded by "a wide array of
monuments, plaques, and seals depicting both the secular and
religious history of Texas."141 Also present on the capitol grounds
were a tribute to African American legislators, a Confederate
plaque, a plaque commemorating the war with Mexico, a
Mexican Eagle and serpent (a symbol of Aztec prophecy), a
Confederate Seal containing the inscription "Deo Vindice" (God
will judge), and four other monuments: a tribute to Texas
children; a tributary statue honoring the role of women in Texas
history; a replica of the Statue of Liberty; and a tribute honoring
those Texans who died at Pearl Harbor. 142
The Fifth Circuit held these displays constitutionally
permissible.143 The court determined that a reasonably informed
viewer144 would conclude that, by erecting the monument, the
138 See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 176 (describing Ten Commandments monument at
issue and noting that it was accepted by joint resolution of the House and Senate in early
1961).
139 See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the court
stated:
(1) the sparse legislative history "contains no record of any discussion about the
monument, or the reasons for its acceptance, and is comprised entirely of House and
Senate Journal entries"; (2) the State selected the site on the recommendation of the
Building Engineering and Management Division of the State Board of Control; (3) the
expenses "were borne exclusively by the Eagles"; (4) the monument requires virtually
no maintenance; and (5) the dedication of the monument was presided over by
Senator Bruce Reagan and Representative Will Smith.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
140 Id. (finding Texas chose monument's site so persons entering the courthouse
would not be subject involuntarily to the monument).
141 Id. at 175-76.
142 Id. at 176.
143 Id. at 182. The circuit court was "persuaded that Texas does not violate the First
Amendment by retaining a forty-two-year-old display of the Decalogue" and added that
"the Ten Commandments monument is part of a display of seventeen monuments, all
located on grounds registered as a historical landmark, and it is carefully located between
the Supreme Court Building and the Capitol Building housing the legislative and
executive branches of government." Id. The court used the standard of a reasonable
observer, stating "[w]e are not persuaded that a reasonable viewer touring the Capitol
and its grounds, informed of its history and its placement, would conclude that the State
is endorsing the religious rather than the secular message of the Decalogue." Id.
144 Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 2003) (asserting that "we disserve
no constitutional principle by concluding that a State's display of the decalogue in a
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state was endorsing merely the secular importance of the
Commandments, rather than their religious message. 145 The
circuit court further noted that "Texas has a record of honoring
the contributions of donors and those they represent," 146 and
found no evidence refuting the state's claim that the monument
was displayed for the purpose of commending the Eagles
organization "for its efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency." 147
ii. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding in Van
Orden.148 In a plurality opinion, delivered by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court focused its analysis on the nature of the
Texas monument within a national historical perspective, stating
that the Lemon Test was not helpful in determining
constitutionality when the government action at issue is
"passive" as in Van Orden.149  Justice Rehnquist found
significance in the fact that "Texas has treated her Capitol
grounds monuments as representing the several strands in the
State's political and legal history,"150 noting that "the inclusion of
manner that honors its secular strength is not inevitably an impermissible endorsement
of its religious message in the eyes of our reasonable observer").
145 Id. at 181. The circuit court stated:
Even those who would see the decalogue as wise counsel born of man's experience
rather than as divinely inspired religious teaching cannot deny its influence upon the
civil and criminal laws of this country. That extraordinary influence has been
repeatedly acknowledged by the Supreme Court and detailed by scholars. Equally so
is its influence upon ethics and the ideal of a just society. A reasonable viewer must
also be aware of the placement of the monument at a point on the direct line between
the legislative chambers, the executive office of the governor, and the Supreme Court
Building. It is plainly linked with those houses of the law while standing apart and
not physically connected to any of them. The decalogue is presented as relevant to
these law-giving instruments of State government, but from a distance.
Id.
146 Id. at 178-79 (illustrating Texas' history of honoring donations by recounting an
example where the Legislature authorized the installation of a replica of the Statue of
Liberty by the Boy Scouts of America).
147 See id. (agreeing that "there is nothing in either the legislative record or the
events attending the monument's installation to contradict the secular reasons laid out in
the legislative record, brief as it is; there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature did not
share the concern about juvenile delinquency).
148 See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
149 Id. at 2861. The Court stated:
Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive
monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, our analysis is
driven both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation's history.
Id.
150 Id. at 2864.
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the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual
significance, partaking of both religion and government."151 This
meant that the monument did not have a "plainly religious
purpose"152 and, thus, was permissible under the Establishment
Clause.153
iii. Analysis
The Court's holding in Van Orden appears to be consistent
with its recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Monuments
like the one at issue in Van Orden are properly viewed as
"private speech."154 The Van Orden monument was funded
entirely by the Fraternal Order of Eagles155 who donated it to the
state. 156  The state placed the monument seemingly
indiscriminately157 in an area surrounded by many other items of
both secular and religious significance.158 The Court made it
clear in Pinette that private religious expression does not violate
the Establishment Clause where it occurs in a traditional or
designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on
151 Id.
152 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863 (contrasting the Van Orden displays with those
from Stone held to display "an improper and plainly religious purpose").
153 See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863 (2005) (concluding that Texas'
display was not violative of the Constitution).
154 Compare Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
841-42 (1995) (finding no Establishment Clause concerns in a university student
publication's funding program imbued with Christian viewpoint inasmuch as the
publication constituted private speech), and Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-
52 (1990) (determining that acts of a Christian student group who sought permission to
use school premises for student-led prayer sessions constituted private speech), with
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (concluding school
district's policy of student-led prayer was public speech and thus government sponsorship
thereof was impermissible under the Establishment Clause).
155 See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that
Fraternal Order of Eagles funded all expenses in connection with the monument). See
generally Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 59 P.3d
655, 657 (Wash. 2000) (quoting Order's statement of purpose as embodied in its articles of
incorporation as, "[u]nit[ing] fraternally for mutual benefit, protection, improvement,
social enjoyment and association, all persons of good moral character who believe in a
Supreme Being to inculcate the principles of liberty, truth, justice and equality").
156 Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 176 (describing Ten Commandments monument as a "gift"
to the state from the Fraternal Order of Eagles).
157 Id. (mentioning that the State selected the site on the recommendation of the
Building Engineering and Management Division of the State Board of Control).
158 See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 176 (describing monument's contextual surroundings);
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 614-19 (1989) (finding relevant the coupling of a
Chanukah menorah, Christmas tree and sign hailing liberty in concluding that the
display of the menorah outside a municipal building did not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause).
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equal terms. 159 Given the diversity of the other items on display
on the Texas capitol grounds,160 along with Texas' history of
accepting and honoring the contributions of donors,161 it would
appear that the capitol grounds are open to any organization
wishing to donate such a display.
Under the Endorsement Test, a reasonable observer, viewing
the monument in this diverse context, would seemingly be no
more likely to believe that the state government is favoring
Judeo-Christian beliefs with its display of the Ten
Commandments monument than he would be to believe that the
state is favoring Aztec beliefs through the display of an Aztec
symbol of prophecy.162 The apparently indiscriminate climate of
the capitol grounds is substantial evidence that a person who
does not hold Judeo-Christian beliefs is unlikely to feel like an
"outsider" while taking a tour of the grounds.163 Furthermore,
even if the Court had chosen to employ the Lemon Test, the
purpose of honoring the Eagles for their efforts in the area of
juvenile delinquency, along with the general theme of history and
diversity that permeates the capitol grounds, would seemingly be
sufficient to show a valid secular purpose. 164 Therefore, the
monument in Van Orden was correctly held to be constitutional.
159 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995)
(differentiating between private speech occurring in a designated public forum and such
expression taking place on property reserved for official government purposes).
160 See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 175-76 (describing "a wide array of monuments,
plaques, and seals depicting both the secular and religious history of Texas").
161 See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 2003) (illustrating Texas'
history of honoring donations).
162 See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 176 (noting "[t]here is a Six Flags Over Texas display
on the floor of the Capitol Rotunda featuring the Mexican Eagle and serpent - which as
visitors will learn, is a symbol of Aztec prophecy"); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) (concluding "no reasonable observer would think a neutral
program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of
the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur
of government endorsement").
163 See Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 175-76 (describing that guided tours offered for those
looking to view the displays arranged on the capitol grounds); see also Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (espousing two-part standard for
Establishment Clause review that has become known as the "Endorsement Test").
164 See Greg Abbott, Acknowledgement Without Endorsement: Defending the Ten
Commandments, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 229, 253-54 (2005) (arguing that legislative
history surrounding monument articulated a valid secular purpose not illegitimated by
the underlying contrary religious purpose of the Ten Commandments). See generally
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1988) (concluding a valid, secular purpose of
combating the social ills associated with teenage pregnancy underpinned a federal
program which dispensed aid to organizations engaged in adolescent pregnancy services);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678-80 (1971) (finding a valid secular purpose behind
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CONCLUSION
The holding in Stone appeared to indicate that the Ten
Commandments are a mostly religious symbol and, therefore,
cannot be properly placed on public property. The Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the time since Stone,
including its holdings in Van Orden and McCreary, however,
indicate that it is possible for the Ten Commandments to be
displayed on public grounds in some circumstances. The recent
decisions seem to suggest that a local government's original
purpose in posting the Commandments, together with the
surrounding environment in which the Commandments are
placed, will be of paramount importance. However, the lack of
one definitive test for determining constitutionality in
Establishment Clause cases likely will continue to be a source of
uncertainty and frustration in deciding such issues.
a Congressional act which provided funding for church-related institutions of higher
education).
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